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 1. Introduction 
 Th e litigation surrounding the future medical treatment of Charlie Gard confi rmed, 
if there ever was any doubt, that the principle by which such cases are to be deter-
mined is the best interests of the child. Although best interests is undoubtedly 
the principle applied by parents and clinicians deciding together upon a child ’ s 
medical treatment and by the court in disputes, I argue that Charlie ’ s case, as with 
other cases in the recent body of case-law, was not a disagreement over Charlie ’ s 
best interests. I argue that questions about Charlie ’ s future medical treatment were 
referred to court not because continued ventilation was, in the professional opin-
ion of the treating clinicians not in Charlie ’ s  best interests but, beyond that, was 
in their professional judgement  inimical to his interests and, I argue, should be 
understood in terms of the provision of continued treatment being  contrary to 
professional conscience. 
 In cases concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment from a child, contrary to the view of the child ’ s parents as to what is in 
their child ’ s best interests, there is a further principle, beyond best interests. 
Originating in the judgment of Lord Donaldson MR in  Re J , 1 this principle is 
that neither the court nor parents can require clinicians to treat contrary to their 
professional judgement. Th is is cited in judgments concerned with the with-
drawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment but its meaning has not been 
examined in detail in the case-law, with the exception of the early judgments of 
Lord  Donaldson MR and Hedley J in  Wyatt . 2 Th e purpose of this chapter is to 
consider what is meant by professional judgement in this context and what eff ect 
it has in practice in terms of the circumstances in which NHS Trusts refer deci-
sions about the future medical treatment of a child to court and the consequences 
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for the subsequent best interests determination. In practice decisions about the 
continuation of life-sustaining treatment 3 are oft en only referred to court where 
the clinicians, supported by second opinions and in accordance with professional 
guidance have reached the limits of what is professionally conscionable. Th is shift  
in practice, to greater accommodation of parental wishes with regard to their 
child ’ s treatment, is consistent with the shift  in medical law to greater respect for 
patient autonomy and for the responsibility of the patient for decisions about his 
or her treatment. Furthermore, it serves to demonstrate that not only the decision 
of the child ’ s parents, in the exercise of their parental responsibility, but also that of 
the child ’ s clinicians, informed by their professional conscience, is driven by caring 
concern for the child. 
 Th is chapter fi rst considers the concepts of professional judgement and profes-
sional conscience. Consideration is then given to  Re J , from which the principle 
that neither the court nor parents can require practitioners to treat contrary to 
their professional judgement originates, and the case of  Wyatt in which Hedley J 
developed the concept of professional conscience. I then examine the case-law 
to demonstrate that although the concept may have originated as a professional 
judgement of the child ’ s best interests in accordance with a competent body of 
professional opinion, many of the recent cases could be understood as examples of 
clinicians considering that not only is continued treatment not in the best interests 
of the child but is against the interests of the child and, as such, is contrary to their 
professional conscience. I demonstrate how this could be a way of understanding 
the case of Charlie Gard. I argue that appreciating that clinicians are seeking a 
ruling from the court because they have reached the limits of what they consider 
conscionable is important for understanding this body of case-law but more 
fundamentally important for parents in such cases to understand why the clini-
cians caring for their child can no longer treat as they wish. 
 2. Professional Judgement and 
Professional Conscience 
 Robin Downie and Jane Macnaughton have explained that a judgement is 
 ‘ an assertion made with some evidence, or for a good reason, in a context of 
uncertainty ’. 4 A professional judgement is one made in a professional context in 
which  ‘ the uncertainty derives from the professional context and the evidence 
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or relevant considerations are acquired by means of professional knowledge and 
skills ’. 5 Professional judgement must be exercised in accordance with a compe-
tent body of professional opinion that is  ‘ capable of withstanding logical analysis ’ 6 
given the risks and benefi ts, and accord with the values of the profession as detailed 
in  Good Medical Practice . 7 Diagnosis, identifi cation of treatment options, assess-
ment of which of the available options is clinically best, and treatment that is in 
the overall best interests of the child are thus professional judgements, informed 
by medical knowledge, experience, and critical refl ection in the context of uncer-
tainty about the effi  cacy of treatment and other relevant factors such as the extent 
to which the child experiences pain and suff ering. Th e conclusion that there are no 
further treatments that can benefi t the child, that continued treatment is  ‘ futile ’, is 
a professional judgement. 
 In the vast majority of cases, the medical treatment of a child is provided 
through a partnership in which professionals, exercising their professional judge-
ment, work together with parents, in the exercise of their parental responsibility, to 
identify the medical treatment that is in the best interests of the child. 8 Clinicians 
may, in the exercise of their professional judgement, be prepared to try a therapy 
even though they do not consider it to be clinically best for the child or in the 
best interests of the child, 9 accommodating parental wishes as far as  ‘ professional 
judgement and conscience ’ allows. 10 Giles Birchley, in his chapter, gives exam-
ples of clinicians off ering treatments perceived to be for the benefi t of the parents 
rather than the child or delaying withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to give 
parents time to come to terms with the situation. 11 
 However, there are limits beyond which clinicians will not wish to go in the 
administration of therapies or interventions to a child which, I argue, should 
be understood in terms of professional conscience. As Jonathan  Montgomery 
has observed, the  ‘ law expects health professionals to have, and act upon, 
consciences ’. 12 Giles Birchley has argued  ‘ conscience has an important part to play 
in the delivery of health care ’, as he observed, we would not want practitioners 
to lack a conscience. 13 Although much of the academic literature is concerned 
with moral conscience  – for example, individual moral judgements aff ecting the 
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involvement of practitioners in, for example, the termination of pregnancy 14 or 
assisted suicide 15  – I am here concerned with professional conscience. Although 
moral values are an inevitable aspect of professional conscience, I am referring 
to a professional, and not a personal, conclusion. As Stephen Smith has argued, 
not all conscience claims are generalisable rules, they also arise where the provi-
sion of treatment which the professional does not have a general objection to, for 
example, mechanical ventilation, can no longer be provided with good conscience 
because, for example, it is sustaining the life of a child who has no conscious inter-
action and no ability to breathe independently, for whom there is no treatment 
and no prospect of recovery. 16 I employ Stephen Smith ’ s three requirements for 
a claim to conscience, namely that the decision is based upon moral values, is 
owned by the individual and relates to the individual ’ s own conduct. 17 Th e exercise 
of professional conscience involves technical expertise as well as moral choices 18 
tested against professional guidance and the opinions of professional colleagues. 19 
Importantly, it should be understood as a caring judgement. A conscientious deci-
sion involves individual moral choices leading the individual to act in a way that 
they strongly and sincerely believe is not morally wrong. 20 As Smith explains, 
decisions based upon conscience need not be based upon a set of rules, although 
they do need to be explained in general terms. As such, a view that the point has 
been reached that continued treatment is contrary to conscience may not have 
been predicted but reasons for that position must be given. Further, it is an indi-
vidual decision, with which others may disagree, and as such is not  ‘ correct ’ 
but a matter of  judgement. 21 In the context of withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining treatment from a child, I argue, an individual professional judgement 
must be supported by the views of others, but that does not preclude disagree-
ment. Practitioners, Giles Birchley has argued, should be encouraged to listen to 
their consciences although they must also be prepared for them to be subjected to 
challenge. 22 
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 3. Professional Conscience in Children ’ s 
Medical Treatment 
 In reaching his judgment following the hearing in April 2017 Francis J applied the 
established framework for judicial determination of the best interests of the child 
to the evidence presented on behalf of Charlie ’ s parents, Guardian and GOSH. 23 
Francis J did not cite the principle which originated in the obiter comments of Lord 
Donaldson MR in  Re J (1990) , 24 that neither the court, nor parents, can require 
clinicians to treat contrary to their professional 25 judgement. 26 Lord Donaldson 
continued to say that parents cannot insist on treatment, and doctors can refuse to 
administer treatment which they consider to be  ‘ medically contra-indicated or for 
some other reason is a treatment which they could not  conscientiously administer 
[emphasis added] ’. 27 As demonstrated below, given the more recent cases, it would 
be more accurate to use the terminology employed by Hedley J in  Wyatt that 
clinicians cannot be required to treat contrary to their professional conscience. 
 Charlotte Wyatt had a range of medical problems, as a result of her premature 
birth at 26 weeks gestation, including chronic respiratory and kidney problems 
and profound brain damage. A year aft er the Trust had successfully applied for 
a declaration that ventilation would not be in Charlotte ’ s best interests if she 
suff ered a respiratory arrest and given improvement in her condition, Charlotte ’ s 
parents applied for a discharge of the declaration whilst the Trust made a  ‘ novel ’ 
application for authority, in the event of an irreconcilable disagreement about her 
treatment, for decisions to be made by her doctors. 28 Th e relationship between 
her parents and the hospital had become volatile and acrimonious; her parents 
had made complaints to the police about Charlotte ’ s care and were only permit-
ted to visit her accompanied by security. 29 Hedley J discharged the declaration 
which had the eff ect of returning responsibility to consent to the provision or 
withholding of ventilation to Charlotte ’ s parents. In these circumstances, Hedley J 
was concerned to explain clearly the nature and limits of the legal and professional 
duties doctors owe to their child patient. Hedley J stressed that where the patient 
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lacks competence the doctor ’ s duty is to act in the patient ’ s best interests and to 
work in partnership with the child ’ s parents, 30 accommodating parental wishes 
where to do so is not an  ‘ aff ront to the clinician ’ s conscience ’. 31 Hedley J delineated 
four categories in which disagreement may arise between parents and clinicians 
about a child ’ s medical treatment: 
  (i)  Where a doctor advocated treatment which parents resisted (eg a blood trans-
fusion) and a failure to administer such treatment would be an aff ront to that 
doctor ’ s conscience; 
  (ii)  Where a doctor advocated treatment which the parents resisted on grounds that, 
whilst reasonable, were contrary to the clinician ’ s view; 
 (iii)  Where parents wanted treatment, which the clinician could not advise, but the 
giving of which would not be an aff ront to conscience; and 
 (iv)  Where the treatment requested would be an aff ront to conscience. 32 
 Th e judge observed that the majority of disagreements fall into the middle two 
categories and that all the clinicians giving evidence to the court agreed that  ‘ in 
those circumstances they would, in the last resort, accommodate the views of the 
parents; and that is as it should be ’. 33 But Hedley J continued, quoting  Re J (1992) , 
to state that professionals cannot be required to act contrary to their professional 
conscience. 34 Acting according to professional conscience was, Hedley J explained, 
an  ‘ intellectual ’ process in which the doctor must take account of all the circum-
stances, professional guidance and second opinions, to conclude what is in the 
patient ’ s best interests and consider whether there is a  ‘ reasonable basis ’ for the 
provision of the treatment even if he is inclined against it. 35 Th e judge explained 
that professional conscience is more of an intuitive than rational confi rmation of the 
intellectual conclusion and  ‘ honed by experience of patients, exposure to the prac-
tice of colleagues, and the ethos of his work ’. 36 Hedley J tentatively concluded that: 
 [W]here a clinician concludes that a requested treatment is inimical to the best interests 
of the patient, and that his professional conscience, intuition or hunch, confi rms that 
view he may refuse to act and cannot be compelled to do so, though he should not 
prevent another from so acting, should that clinician feel able so to do. 37 
 Hedley J was not referring to the legal duty to act in accordance with a competent 
body of professional opinion, or the professional duty to act in the best interests 
of the child as in the majority of cases where treatment decisions are reached by 
doctors and parents working in partnership. He was referring to circumstances in 
which the professional judgement is not only that the treatment is not in the best 
interests of the patient but that it is  ‘ inimical ’ to the best interests of the patient 
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and further contrary to professional conscience. Although Hedley J used the 
term  ‘ professional conscience ’, it is clear from his exposition of the concept that 
he was referring to the discharge of professional duties rather than a process of 
 examining individual or personal conscience. As Sara Forvargue and Mary Neal 
have argued, Hedley J was not here referring to a  ‘ general right of conscience ’. 38 
It is clear from his exposition that Hedley J was contemplating  individual profes-
sional judgements 39 rather than  personal judgements upon the medical treatment 
of a child. Th e judge was not considering  ‘ predictable ’  ‘ generalisable rules ’ such as 
a conscientious objection to the termination of pregnancy but  ‘ practices which 
the doctor does not usually object to but does so in  this instance on  these facts ’. 40 
What Hedley J seemed to be contemplating in  Re Wyatt was a professional judge-
ment of the limits of what is acceptable in the provision of treatment or medical 
intervention given the current diagnosis and prognosis, second opinions and 
professional guidance. Hedley J was, I argue, invoking a concept of  ‘ conscien-
tious professional discretion ’. 41 As such it might be what Stephen Smith has 
argued is  ‘ a  ‘ bridge too far ’, so that treatment previously provided has now become 
 ‘ objectionable ’, 42 or the child ’ s condition deteriorated so that what may have once 
been in the child ’ s best interests or whilst not the best option within the range of 
acceptable options or something that it is acceptable to do at parental request has 
crossed a line and become unconscionable. Inevitably, it is also the case that the 
provision of treatment or continued treatment is not in the child ’ s best interests. 
Clinicians may also use terms such as futile or unethical. 43 But, I argue, the benefi t 
of understanding the decision in terms of professional conscience it to under-
stand that a professional judgement has been reached, supported by independent 
opinion, that to be asked to continue to treat is to be asked to do something they 
consider to be professionally wrong. I now turn to consider the case-law, which 
I  argue demonstrates a shift  from professional judgement about a child ’ s best 
interests to the limits of what is professionally conscionable. 
 4. Ending Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: From 
Professional Judgement to Professional Conscience ? 
 In  Re J (1990) there was  ‘ no real diff erence of opinion ’ between J ’ s parents and 
clinicians but the decision as to J ’ s future medical treatment was a matter for the 
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court as J was, for unrelated reasons, a ward of court. 44 Th e question was whether 
it was in J ’ s best interests to be ventilated in the event of a crisis where this would 
enable him to survive a life-threatening event but further compromise his qual-
ity of life. Th e application of the principle that neither parent nor the court can 
require clinicians to treat contrary to their professional judgement had the conse-
quence that the professional judgement of the child ’ s best interests prevailed. 45 In 
 Re C , as the unanimous evidence of the doctors was that reventilation was not 
in C ’ s best interests, the court could not make an order which would require the 
clinicians to  ‘ undertake a course of treatment which they are unwilling to do ’. 46 
Cazalet J in  A National Health Service Trust v D stated that the court could not 
require clinicians to treat contrary to their clinical judgement of the best inter-
ests of the child but emphasised that clinicians were at liberty to reassess  D upon 
admission and provide ventilation if appropriate. 47 Counsel for the Trust, parents 
and Offi  cial Solicitor in  Royal Wolverhampton Hospital NHS Trust v B were agreed 
that the court cannot order treatment overriding the clinical judgement of the 
child ’ s doctors. 48 
 Th is too was the application of the principle in respect of the future treat-
ment of Charlotte Wyatt. In the fi rst application to court in October 2004 when 
 Charlotte was one year old, the view of her clinicians was that she would suff er a 
fatal respiratory infection over the winter. Although it was agreed that she should 
be maintained in her present condition, medical opinion was unanimous that in 
the event of respiratory infection it was not in her best interests to ventilate her. 
Hedley J considered the dispute to fall into the third category of cases he identifi ed 
(above), in that all medical experts were agreed that it was not in Charlotte ’ s best 
interests to reventilate but that an elective tracheostomy or initial ventilation was 
not an aff ront to their professional conscience. 49 Making the declaration, Hedley J 
emphasised that it was permissive and, consequently, it would be lawful to with-
hold ventilation but the clinicians should act according to their clinical judgement 
of Charlotte ’ s best interests. 
 A year later, Hedley J summed up the evidence before the court which was 
that, apart from Dr G, all were agreed that Charlotte should be provided with all 
treatment other than invasive intensive care. If she survived mechanical ventila-
tion it would in all likelihood cause a signifi cant deterioration in her condition 
from which she was unlikely to recover but it was doubtful whether she would 
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damage [23]. A second opinion from a consultant neonatologist, in December 2013, expressed the 
opinion that  ‘ the baby had suff ered catastrophic brain damage, which rendered him unable to move or 
to breathe for himself without hope of survival without invasive ventilation ’ [8]. Ten months later, when 
Russell J made declarations that it was lawful to withdraw ventilation, there had been no improvement 
only deterioration and there was no prospect of improvement;  Central Manchester University Hospitals 
NHS Foundation Trust v A and others [ 2015 ]  EWHC 2828 , children were  ‘ artifi cially surviving ’, their 
condition was irreversible and could only deteriorate further [25] such that  ‘ prolongation of the treat-
ment not only futile but unjustifi able ’ [18];  An Hospital Trust v GM, DK, HK [ 2017 ]  EWHC 1710 , 
nothing to be gained from further neurosurgical intervention, no prospect of any recovery, condition 
will continue to deteriorate and baby will not survive long [21]. Th e unanimous medical evidence 
before the court in the case of Isaiah Haastrup was that ventilation would sustain his life but there was 
no therapy or treatment available and, due to the severity of his brain damage, there no prospect of 
recovery or improvement,  King ’ s College NHS Trust v Th omas  & Haastrup [ 2018 ]  EWHC 127 . 
survive and so ventilation would deny her a  ‘ peaceful death ’. 50 Concluding that it 
was not in Charlotte ’ s best interests to die while receiving futile, aggressive, treat-
ment, Hedley J noted: 
 Dr H and Dr A came close to saying that such treatment would be inconsistent with 
professional conscience. Others, like Dr F and Dr I, did not go that far but expressed 
fi rm views that such treatment would not accord with her best interests. 51 
 However, a careful reading of the more recent cases demonstrates a greater will-
ingness on the part of clinicians to continue to treat at the request of parents 
only seeking a declaration of the court where continued treatment is, in profes-
sional judgement, not only not in the best interests of the child but, in the 
professional judgement of clinicians antithetical to the interests of the child 52 
and, as such, could be considered to be contrary to professional conscience in the 
sense detailed by Hedley J in  Wyatt . As such, they have reached the limits of what 
is possible and permissible. For example,  An NHS Trust v W and X concerned 
11-year-old X who had, three months earlier, contracted a virus that compromised 
his heart functioning. He was admitted to hospital with end-stage heart failure 
and was fi tted with devices as a temporary measure prior to a heart transplant, for 
which there were long waiting lists. X ’ s lung functioning was deteriorating, caused 
in part by a blood clot around his left  lung, his chest had to be kept open (increasing 
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the risk of infection), his kidney function was deteriorating, his muscles were 
wasting, his skin was breaking down. He had to be given the maximum dosage of 
ketamine to make any procedure, such as turning, tolerable. Due to these compli-
cations, X was no longer suitable for a transplant. Th e Trust sought a declaration 
that it was not unlawful to withdraw the devices which were keeping him alive. His 
surgeon ’ s evidence was that they had 
 left  no stone unturned in their attempts to treat this young boy and have nothing left  to 
off er that can achieve a promising future. In my opinion, we are lengthening X ’ s suff er-
ing without any chance of success; this is as futile as it can get. 53 
 Bodey J concluded that the  ‘ evidence points all one way ’ ; 54 that  ‘ the limits of what 
is technically feasible ’ had been reached, 55 X was in extreme pain and the devices 
were merely prolonging an inevitable death. 
 In  An NHS Trust v A  & B  & C , having unsuccessfully tried eight medications 
in an attempt to control C ’ s seizures which daily required bagging and regularly 
required cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), graphically described in the judg-
ment, the clinicians responsible for his care, supported by second opinions, had 
reached the conclusion that there was no treatment available which could restore 
his health or improve his condition. Th e medical evidence was that the continued 
use of bagging and CPR aft er the trial of the  ‘ fi nal option ’ medication had proved 
unsuccessful was merely delaying an inevitable death. Russell J noted,  ‘ Th ere can 
be little doubt that the discomfort felt by the medical professionals refl ects their 
reluctance to continually infl ict pain and distress to C. ’ 56 To do so when there 
was no treatment they could off er to improve his condition and when death was 
inevitable was contrary to his interests and, it could be argued, the professional 
conscience of those responsible for his medical care. 
 In  GOSH v NO  & KK  & MK , 57 Great Ormond Street Hospital sought a decla-
ration of the court that it would not be in the best interests of eight-month-old 
MK, who had been diagnosed prior to birth with a heart condition which carried 
a high risk of mortality, to have further aggressive treatment but that care should 
be reoriented to palliative care. MK had undergone heart surgery, but due to 
complications it had not been possible to perform the necessary second-stage 
operation. At a meeting of her treating team it had been agreed that there were 
no further surgical options available, a view shared by clinicians at Evelina and 
Birmingham Children ’ s Hospital. Russell J noted that:  ‘All the medical opinion is 
that MK is not in a clinical position to receive any further surgical treatment. ’ 58 
Th ere was no medical or nursing evidence or opinion before the court supporting 
the continuation of active treatment. For the Trust it was argued that to administer 
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 ‘  further  painful and invasive medical interventions in circumstances where her 
death is both imminent and inevitable will confer on her no medical benefi t, 
cause her unnecessary pain, suff ering and distress and would not be in her best 
interests ’. 59 Th e judge concluded that MK was  ‘ dying and nothing can be done to 
reverse that process ’ and that the ventilation and CPR her parents wanted her to 
have would cause her suff ering but only  ‘ delay her death by a very short time ’. 60 
Although the case appears to be one of a disagreement about the best interests of 
a child for whom there was no active treatment, for her clinicians to put her to the 
risk of anaesthesia and consequent sedation for ventilation or to carry out CPR 
on a child who had had two heart operations could be seen as not only not in her 
best interests but inimical to her best interests and unconscionable. Th e evidence 
before MacDonald J in  King ’ s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MH was 
that to intubate and provide artifi cial ventilation to seven-year-old Y who had 
spinal muscular atrophy type 1 and showed no evidence of cognitive activity 
following cardiorespiratory arrest would not  ‘ alter her prognosis ’ but would lead 
to  ‘ an unquantifi able period of time having her life artifi cially maintained on an 
intensive care unit ’ from which she would never leave. 61 
 With evident distress, in his evidence the treating clinician in  Re A told the 
court: 
 Th is is the fi rst time in my twenty-seven years I ’ m coming here and it is prolonging a 
suff ering and we are here. It was not an easy decision for the whole team to come here. 
I mean, we thought long and hard. It is not only the 8 paediatric intensive consultants, 
it is 80 – 100 odd nurses, it is the neurology team, the neurosurgery team, it is the physi-
otherapists. Everything together, we decided that it is not in A ’ s best interest to continue 
this type of intensive care to keep him alive. He is not benefi ting from any of this and 
that is why we ’ re here, so that deferring it, and for us, we think that it is inhuman to keep 
A-a suff ering like that. Th at ’ s why we ’ re here. 62 
 Th is position was articulated on behalf of the Trust in  An NHS Trust v AB : 
 Miss Powell explained to the court that the medical team have now reached the stage 
where they would decline to treat AB as it would be unethical so to do. When asked by 
my Lord, McCombe LJ, whether that was the same as a best interest test, she said that it 
was not. What it represented, she told the court, was that we have now reached a state 
of aff airs where the clinicians have come to the view that AB ’ s clinical condition is such 
that life preserving treatment is so contrary to her best interest that it would be inimical 
to their respective Hippocratic oaths to treat her and would therefore be unethical. 63 
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 In the case of Alfi e Evans, 64 Hayden J considered at length the medical evidence 
of those responsible for his care at Alder Hey, the second opinions secured by 
the Trust and from the parents ’ expert, and the views of clinicians from Rome 
and Munich who were prepared to accept him as a patient. Although he had at 
that time no diagnosis, his clinicians were of the opinion that there were  ‘ no more 
tests which can now sensibly be undertaken ’, 65 and there was no medical treatment 
available to him. Th e medical evidence was that his brain had been irrecoverably 
devastated by a progressive, ultimately fatal neurodegenerative condition such that 
continued ventilation sustained his life but there was no prospect of any recovery 
of his brain function. As judgements about professional conscience are individ-
ual judgements, although ones that needs to be supported by other professionals, 
where it is not contrary to the conscience of another professional to treat a trans-
fer should be arranged if it is safe to do so. 66 Th e clinicians in Rome and Munich 
did not have a diff erent opinion about Alfi e ’ s prognosis or treatment options 
but rather upon the management of his end-of-life care. Th e hospital in Rome 
was prepared to off er long-term ventilation and feeding by nasogastric tube, the 
German doctor to provide home ventilation and training for his parents in its use. 
As Hayden J observed this distinction was a matter of personal belief not profes-
sional judgement. 67 Further, his clinician considered that transfer risked sudden 
and undignifi ed death and where that was proposed for  ‘ treatment ’ which would 
be of no benefi t,  ‘ [a]s treating doctors we cannot in  good conscience agree that 
by simply transferring Alfi e to another hospital (to continue prolonged treatment 
which is of no benefi t to Alfi e) that we are acting fi rst and foremost in Alfi e ’ s best 
interests [emphasis added] ’. 68 
 5. Professional Conscience in the Care of Charlie Gard 
 Charlie ’ s life had been sustained by mechanical ventilation while the doctors at 
Great Ormond Street Hospital explored all therapeutic options, including nucleo-
side bypass therapy. Initially prepared to try nucleoside bypass therapy, as it had 
not been tested or used in patients with Charlie ’ s condition, 69 they prepared an 
application to their Clinical Ethics Committee. Before this application could be 
made, Charlie suff ered seizures that his treating doctors considered caused him 
irreversible brain damage. In these changed circumstances, his clinicians in the 
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exercise of their professional judgement believed that it was no longer in Charlie ’ s 
best interests to try the therapy. His clinicians considered that trial of the ther-
apy was futile and consequently, as it was agreed that his  ‘ present quality of life is 
one that is not worth sustaining ’, 70 it was in his best interests for ventilation to be 
withdrawn. Charlie ’ s parents disagreed. In the exercise of their parental responsi-
bility, Charlie ’ s parents reached a considered decision that continued ventilation 
to enable a trial of nucleoside bypass therapy was in Charlie ’ s best interests and 
that the therapy off ered a chance which Charlie should be given. Charlie ’ s parents 
thus disagreed with his clinicians ’ judgements about best interests, futility and the 
ethics of trial of the therapy. 
 Charlie ’ s clinicians reached a conclusion about his best interests aft er consider-
ing all the circumstances, that is, his diagnosis and prognosis, and their professional 
judgement that the therapy would be of no benefi t. In multidisciplinary meetings 
they reviewed the evidence from the US doctor. Th ey secured second opinions 
from St Mary ’ s, Southampton, Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Foundation Trust and 
the independent expert for the parents from Southampton General to test whether 
there was a reasonable basis for trial of the therapy informed by the practice of 
colleagues. Withdrawal of ventilation was in accordance with the Royal College 
of Paediatrics and Child Health good-practice framework. 71 On the basis of this 
evidence, trial of the therapy and consequently continued ventilation for that 
purpose was not in Charlie ’ s best interests, nor was it within the range of accept-
able options, or an option to which they could accede to at parental request. Given 
that their professional judgement was that Charlie had no spontaneous respi-
ration, no purposeful response, was not capable of spontaneous movement, his 
condition was deteriorating, irreversible and the invasive procedures necessary to 
sustain his life were probably causing him pain and suff ering, 72 to continue with 
those life-sustaining procedures could be seen to be antithetical to his interests. 
 Considering whether to grant a further stay of the declaration to enable the 
European Court of Human Rights to consider the parents ’ application, Lady 
Hale observed that it was lawful for the clinicians to continue to provide ventila-
tion and artifi cial nutrition and hydration. However, following the conclusion of 
Francis  J that it was not in Charlie ’ s best interests, his clinicians felt that it was 
 ‘ professionally wrong ’ to continue to act  ‘ otherwise ’ and  ‘ contrary ’ to his best 
interests. 73 Although this was in the context of the determination by Francis J of 
Charlie ’ s best interests, the judge had confi rmed their professional judgement 
of Charlie ’ s best interests. I argue that they had reached the point where they could 
150 Jo Bridgeman
  74  In the matter of Charlie Gard (Permission to Appeal Hearing) , 8 June 2017,  www.supremecourt.uk/
news/permission-to-appeal-hearing-in-the-matter-of-charlie-gard.html , [15]. 
  75  J  Brierley ,  J  Linthicum and  A  Petros ,  ‘ Should Religious Beliefs Be Allowed to Stonewall a Secu-
lar Approach to Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment in Children ? ’ ( 2013 )  39  Journal of Medical 
Ethics  573 , identify steps taken to resolve disagreements including discussions with the multidiscipli-
nary team, assistance of religious leaders, ethical reviews, second opinions and the Patient Advice and 
Liaison Service. 
  76  With  Montgomery being understood by many commentators as a continuation of the trajectory in 
which the law has been travelling towards recognition of patient autonomy:  R  Heywood and  J  Miola , 
 ‘ Th e Changing Face of Pre-operative Medical Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the Matter ’ 
( 2017 )  LQR  296 ;  JM  Laing ,  ‘ Delivering Informed Consent Post-Montgomery: Implications for Medi-
cal  Practice and Professionalism ’ ( 2017 )  2  Tottel’s Journal of Professional Negligence  128 . Although 
 Jonathan Montgomery and Elsa Montgomery argued that the principle of respect for patient autonomy 
was only upheld by failing to respect the choices and characteristics of the patient:  J  Montgomery and 
 E   Montgomery ,  ‘ Montgomery on Informed Consent: An Inexpert Decision ’ ( 2016 )  42  Journal of Medi-
cal Ethics  89 . 
no longer, in all good conscience, participate in the provision of ventilation to 
maintain his life at the point at which, unable to persuade his parents, the Trust 
applied to court for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. I argue that Char-
lie ’ s case could and should be understood as only being referred to court when his 
clinicians believed that continued ventilation for the provision of a therapy that in 
their professional judgement was futile was not only not in Charlie ’ s best interests 
but, furthermore, was  ‘ professionally wrong ’ 74 was  ‘ otherwise ’, perhaps  ‘ inimical ’, 
to his best interests. To do so would be causing harm to a child in their care, which 
was contrary to their conscience. 
 6. Why is Consideration of Professional Conscience 
Signifi cant in Children ’ s Medical Treatment Cases ? 
 Best interests, long-established and recently confi rmed by the Supreme Court 
in Charlie ’ s case as the principle by which judges determine disputes between 
 professionals and parents as to whether it is lawful to continue to treat a child, has 
proven resistant to challenge. However, it has not been the purpose of this chapter 
to do so. 
 Th e purpose of this chapter has been to identify a shift  in the circumstances in 
which cases are being brought to court for authority to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from a child. 75 Analysis of the early case-law demonstrates 
that court authority was sought when clinicians wanted to treat in accordance with 
their professional judgement as to a child ’ s best interests. Now, the majority of 
cases are brought to court only when the responsible clinicians have reached the 
conclusion that to provide the treatment the parents have requested is contrary 
to the interests of the child and continued treatment is contrary to their profes-
sional conscience. If, as the wealth of academic literature refl ecting upon changes 
in the doctor – adult patient relationship and its legal regulation argues, 76 patients 
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are regarded not as passive recipients of care but as autonomous decision-makers, 
rights-holders and increasingly  ‘ consumers exercising choices ’, 77 in the context 
of the medical treatment of children, it is parents who are claiming rights and 
making choices. Parents, like the patients recognised in  Montgomery , are able to 
secure information about symptoms, investigations, treatment options, risks and 
side-eff ects via the Internet and from patient support groups and other sources 
of information. Like adult patients, parents are  ‘ capable of understanding that 
medical treatment is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting respon-
sibility for the taking of risks aff ecting their [children ’ s] lives, and living with the 
consequences of their choices ’. 78 But choices can only be made from the options 
available, which may include those that clinicians consider not to be in the best 
interests of the child but those they are prepared to provide. But a change in 
circumstances can mean that what was once an acceptable option has become an 
aff ront to professional conscience. 
 Th e best interests of the child is a titanic principle that is inured to erosion 
in either courtroom or practice. Stephen Smith has argued that where claims 
to conscience are at issue the reasons the doctor cannot provide the requested 
treatment become wrapped up within the best interests assessment, 79 as they did 
in Charlie ’ s case. Th e Court of Appeal in  Wyatt , and the appeal courts in  Gard 
rejecting the arguments for a threshold of signifi cant harm, emphasised that when 
the matter has been referred to court 
 the forensic debate should, in our judgment, be unfettered by any potentially conten-
tious glosses on the best interests test which are likely either inappropriately to shift  the 
focus of the debate, or to restrict the broad exercise of the judicial discretion involved in 
balancing the multifarious factors in the case. 80 
 In practice, however, the move seems to be to the position set out by Hedley J in 
 Re Wyatt , that the clinician 
 does not take orders from the family any more than he gives them. He acts in what he 
sees as the best interests of the child: no more and no less. In so doing, however, parental 
wishes should be accommodated as far as professional judgement and conscience will 
permit, but no further. It is vital that that is understood by all. 81 
 Th e signifi cance for understanding the limits of the professional judgement of 
conscience in the future care of a seriously ill or dying child is threefold. First, it 
would enable a better understanding as to why, in cases referred to court, judges 
usually agree with the child ’ s clinicians rather than parents. Th is is not out of defer-
ence to the medical profession or that the clinicians are better placed than parents 
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to decide what is in the best interests of the child  ‘ in the widest possible sense ’, but 
because continued provision of treatment has gone beyond the limits of what is 
professionally conscionable. Secondly, explanation as to why the clinicians cannot 
agree to the treatment parents want for their child may serve to assist parents to 
understand that the limits of what is possible have been reached and prevent the 
need for court intervention. Th irdly, decisions to end life-sustaining medical inter-
ventions on a seriously ill child will always be extremely diffi  cult, and where they 
follow disagreement with the responsible clinicians and the decision of a court, 
they will inevitably be extremely distressing. It is important to appreciate that this 
conclusion results from the demonstration by clinicians that they have reached the 
limits of the professionally possible and permissible in their professional judge-
ment of care for the child, not a competing view of what is best. 
 
